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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
SECTION 4-406. Customer's Duty to Discover and Report
Unauthorized Signature or Alteration
WUEST BROS., INC, V. LIBERTY NAT'L BANK & TRUST CO.
388 S.W.2d 364 (Ky. 1965)
Over a period of eighteen months, the plaintiff's bookkeeper forged sev-
enteen checks totalling $19,900. These checks were drawn on the defendant
bank which returned the cancelled checks to the plaintiff monthly. When an
audit of the plaintiff's accounts uncovered the forgeries, the defendant refused
to make good the loss. The plaintiff instituted this action alleging that the
defendant had not exercised ordinary care in honoring the forged checks. A
verdict was returned for the defendant. The plaintiff, however, was awarded
the amount of the first check forged.
This court sustained the trial court's finding that the defendant had ex-
ercised reasonable care and its instruction to the jury to find for the defendant
if it determined that the plaintiff had been negligent in examining the can-
celled checks each month, but to award the plaintiff the amount of the first
check forged even if the plaintiff were negligent.
The court noted that while the Uniform Commercial Code was not in
effect when the forgeries occurred, Sections 4-406(1), (2) (a), (b) and (3) are
in harmony with this result and would control similar cases in the future.
S.L.B.
ARTICLE 7: DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
SECTION 7-303. Diversion; Reconsignment; Change
of I nstructions
KORESKA V. UNITED CARGO CORP,
258 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 1965)
The plaintiff, an Austrian manufacturer of thermographic copying paper,
sold or contracted to sell four containers of the paper to a New York buyer,
Parker Whitney. The defendant, an operator of a container delivery service
between the United States and Europe, issued a negotiable bill of lading to
Allgemeine, a forwarding agency, for the shipment of the four containers.
The document named the plaintiff's collecting agent, Bankers Trust, as con-
signee, required that the arrival notice be sent to Parker Whitney and further
provided that delivery was to be made only on surrender of the original bill
of lading. When the goods arrived in New York, the defendant delivered
them to Parker Whitney without requiring the original bill and before the
plaintiff had received his purchase price. In a suit by the plaintiff against the
defendant to recover the value of the copying paper, the defendant contended
that it had been excused from requiring the original bill before delivering the
goods by an oral waiver made by the plaintiff's agent, Allgemeine, and also
by a trade custom and course of dealing. The defendant specifically alleged
that Abbe, Allgemeine's representative in New York, had orally requested
that delivery be made in the usual manner, i.e., without requiring the original
bill of lading; that for the convenience of both shipper and consignee, it had
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been the custom for the shipper to deliver goods without requiring the original
bills; that the other nine containers in the instant shipment had been delivered
without requiring the original bills; and that even though the defendant had
delivered the four containers to Parker Whitney on November 21, 1963, the
plaintiff had made no complaint until May 1964. The plaintiff moved for
summary judgment, producing an affidavit by Abbe in which he stated that
he and Allgemeine had acted as agent for the defendant, not for the plaintiff.
The supreme court entered an order denying the plaintiff's motion.
In vacating the order and granting the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, the present court held that the defendant had introduced no evi-
dentiary facts to the effect that Allgemeine was the plaintiff's agent or had the
power to bind the plaintiff in the alleged manner. However, even if the defend-
ant had raised a triable issue of fact as to Allgemeine's agency, the court
held that there were at least three reasons which supported its decision. First,
under the Personal Property Law and Sections 7-303(1) (a) and -403 of the
Code, only a consignee or other holder of the negotiable bill was entitled to
authorize a diversion from the delivery terms. Since there was no showing
that the bill had actually been indorsed to the defendant, under the Personal
Property Law and Section 1-201(20), the defendant was never a holder.
Moreover, the plaintiff, not being a consignee or holder, did not have the
power to divert the goods without the cooperation of his consignee. It follows
that Allgemeine, even if it were plaintiff's agent, had no power to divert the
goods. Second, the waiver was merely oral, while the bill required that a
waiver had to be expressly stated and signed by the plaintiff or his agent.
Furthermore, ordinary prudence and Section 7-303 (2) of the Code required
that the waiver be noted on the bill itself. Third, the allegations as to trade
custom were insignificant since under previous case law and Section 1-205(4)
of the Code, the express term, which required delivery "in accordance with the
consignee's order," controlled where the trade custom was inconsistent with it.
The dissent was of the view that summary judgment should not be
granted since there were triable fact issues. If Abbe and his employer Allge-
meine were the plaintiff's agent and if they had authorized delivery without
surrender of the original bill of lading, then under Sections 7-302 and -303
there was no conversion.
The court did not cite the Code, which was not in effect at the time of
the transaction, for purposes of authority, but only for the purpose of indicat-
ing that the Code was in accord with its reasoning.
R.G.K.
SECTION 7-403. Obligation of Warehouseman or Carrier
to Deliver; Excuse
KORESKA V. UNITED CARGO CORP.
258 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 1965)
Annotated under Section 7-303, supra.
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